AS IS WELL KNOWN, one of Kant's major concerns was the reconciliation of Newtonian science and metaphysics, a preoccupation made particularly acute by the need to provide a satisfactory explanation of organisms. It is in light of his claim that only the mechanistic principles of Newton's physics can provide scientific knowledge that the role to be played by purposiveness becomes problematic. Purpose appears to resist mechanistic explanation and is therefore a major impediment to unifying science under one set of principles. (...) Kant concludes that although organisms cannot be explained mechanistically, the impossibility is due to a limitation of reason. By appealing to the critical turn Kant thus avoids an antinomy between mechanism and finality while allowing that it is possible for mechanism and finality to be reconciled in the supersensible. This reconciliation, unfortunately, we will never know. (shrink)

The overwhelming majority of action theories have relied on a Humean model of causality and of explanation; even those theories that explicitly reject aspects of that model uncritically adopt others. The atomistic presuppositions embodied in the model are unable to account for either the dynamic and fabric-like nature of action or the features of control and meaning present therein. It is these atomistic presuppositions that give rise to the “Gettier-like vexations” that are common counterexamples in action theory. The Humean requirement (...) that cause and effect be only contingently connected and generalizable into a covering law is also discussed with respect to the explanation of action.Representatives of the three major approaches to the problem of action: causal (including intentional, volitional, as well as agent causation and reasons-as-causes theories), behaviorist, so-called “contextual”, and teleological theories are examined. (shrink)

The overwhelming majority of action theories have relied on a Humean model of causality and of explanation; even those theories that explicitly reject aspects of that model uncritically adopt others. The atomistic presuppositions embodied in the model are unable to account for either the dynamic and fabric-like nature of action or the features of control and meaning present therein. It is these atomistic presuppositions that give rise to the “Gettier-like vexations” that are common counterexamples in action theory. The Humean requirement (...) that cause and effect be only contingently connected and generalizable into a covering law is also discussed with respect to the explanation of action.Representatives of the three major approaches to the problem of action: causal (including intentional, volitional, as well as agent causation and reasons-as-causes theories), behaviorist, so-called “contextual”, and teleological theories are examined. (shrink)

After a brief summary of Alvin Goldman’s theory of the “level-generation” of complex act-tokens from basic acts, it is argued that if the occurrent want which causes the basic act becomes deactivated in medias res, or during the interval between the basic act and the generated events, the latter do not qualify as actions proper. A discussion follows of Steven Davis’s at tempts to provide a counterexample to GoIdman’s theory by suggesting an example in which the Goldman conditions are met (...) and yet intuition tells us that the generated event is not an action. After concluding that Davis’s counterexamples are men of straw, a series of legitimately generated events which terminate in non-action is offered. (shrink)

After a brief summary of Alvin Goldman’s theory of the “level-generation” of complex act-tokens from basic acts, it is argued that if the occurrent want which causes the basic act becomes deactivated in medias res, or during the interval between the basic act and the generated events, the latter do not qualify as actions proper. A discussion follows of Steven Davis’s at tempts to provide a counterexample to GoIdman’s theory by suggesting an example in which the Goldman conditions are met (...) and yet intuition tells us that the generated event is not an action. After concluding that Davis’s counterexamples are men of straw, a series of legitimately generated events which terminate in non-action is offered. (shrink)

Vattimo rethinks ontology at a time when modernity's concept of Being has been uprooted along with any faith in history as a unitary process characterized by progressive reappropriations of its own origins. Having dissolved the ground of the new, the end of modernity sees Being reduced to exchange value, the new for the sake of the new, which in turn science and technology make routine. The impasse is a radical one, for modernity cannot be left behind by offering a truer (...) foundation, since "overcoming" and "foundation" themselves are concepts central to modernity. The first section of the book consists in an account of this condition. (shrink)

Classical philosophy of science ran out of gas because it lacked a subject matter all along. It belongs "subsumed under a unified social science which in its search for regularities and causal mechanisms will provide the basis for science policy".